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ome key features of the behavior of inflation in the United States
appear to have changed in the past 20 years, with potentially
important implications for forecasters and policymakers. A
number of recent studies have provided strong evidence of a decline in
the quarter-to-quarter or year-to-year variability of inflation. There is
also evidence, albeit less conclusive, of a reduction in inflation persist-
ence, which is a measure of how long it takes inflation to return to
baseline after an unexpected change. Such shifts in the behavior or
dynamics of inflation would necessitate changes in the economic rela-
tionships used by policymakers and economists to assess current
conditions, forecast key economic indicators, and determine the impli-
cations of policy changes for future economic activity. 
Because inflation is ultimately a monetary phenomenon, the shift in
dynamics might be due to a systematic change in the conduct of mone-
tary policy since the late 1970s or early 1980s. Examinations of
monetary policy, however, have yet to provide convincing evidence of
such a shift. While some evidence suggests that the behavior of policy
changed dramatically in the late 1970s or early 1980s, several empirical
studies find that it has been stable.1
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The shift in U.S. inflation dynamics might also reflect structural
changes in the economy. Structural changes in the economy can affect
the price-setting behavior of individual firms, which, when aggregated
into the overall price index, could lead to changes in inflation dynamics.
According to basic economic theory, a firm determines its desired price
as a markup over the marginal cost of inputs to production. Structural
changes in the economy that affect the business cycle behavior of input
costs or the markups charged by firms can alter the behavior of firms’
prices. Such changes may include an increase in global competition or
technological advances. Other changes, such as the increased use of
temporary workers, could affect the behavior of marginal costs by pro-
viding firms with more flexibility in their use of inputs and, in turn,
with less volatile input costs. Additionally, firms may sometimes allow
their actual prices to differ from their desired levels because of the costs
involved in adjusting prices. Recent advances in information technol-
ogy, however, may have reduced these adjustment costs, making it cost
effective for firms to update prices more frequently. The important
question is whether these structural changes have led to systematic dif-
ferences in aggregate inflation dynamics over the business cycle.
This article will examine how structural changes in the economy
over the past two decades may have affected the price-setting behavior
of firms and, in turn, the behavior of aggregate inflation. The first
section presents empirical evidence on changes in inflation dynamics.
The second section begins the analysis of structural changes at the firm
level, focusing on factors affecting the behavior of wages, the cost of
capital, and materials costs. The third section focuses on the markup of
price over marginal cost, discussing the impact of increases in global
competition on pricing behavior. The fourth section explores how
information technology may affect the costs associated with changing
prices and, therefore, the frequency of price adjustment. Following the
discussion of how individual firms set their prices, the fifth section
examines how these changes in firm pricing behavior may translate into
decreases in the persistence and volatility of aggregate inflation. The
article concludes that structural changes in the economy over the past
20 years have likely contributed to a decrease in the persistence and
volatility of inflation.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2003 7
I. INFLATION DYNAMICS
Although inflation dynamics may be characterized by a wide variety of
measures, much recent research has focused on two statistical features:
volatility, or how much inflation varies from quarter to quarter or year to
year; and persistence, or the speed with which inflation returns to baseline
after a shock. In statistical terms, these concepts are distinct, but not
entirely so. Other things equal, less persistence leads to less variability.
Lower persistence is associated with faster but smaller swings in inflation
over time that, in statistical terms, reduce the overall variability of inflation.
By both measures, the dynamics of core consumer price inflation
have shifted significantly in the past 20 years. The volatility of inflation—
measured here by the average absolute change in quarterly inflation—has
clearly fallen (Chart 1). The volatility of core CPI inflation declined from
0.32 percentage point over 1960–82 to 0.12 percentage point over
1983–2002 (Table 1). The variability of core inflation in the personal
consumption expenditures (PCE) price index posted a similar decline.
Empirical studies have also found that the variance of inflation was lower
over the past two decades than in the 1960s and 1970s (Cogley and
Chart 1
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Sargent; Stock and Watson).2 Admittedly, abstracting from the high vari-
ability of the 1970s and early 1980s makes the evidence on inflation
volatility more mixed. When the past 20 years are compared with the
1960s, inflation volatility has declined as measured by the core CPI but
not by the core PCE price index (Table 1).
The persistence of inflation also appears to have fallen in the past 20
years. According to formal statistical tests that treat the date of the change
as unknown and seek to identify it, the decline in persistence occurred in
the early 1990s (Table 2).3 In the case of the core CPI, persistence
declined from a value of 0.90 for 1960–1990 to 0.77 for 1990–2002. For
the conventional measure of persistence used in this article, an estimate
near 1 would correspond to extremely high persistence, while an estimate
of 0 would represent no persistence. An even stronger decline in persist-
ence was found using the core PCE price index, where the estimated
value fell from 0.89 for 1960-1992 to 0.66 for 1992–2002.4
While statistical studies have shown formal statistical tests to be
effective at identifying whether persistence has changed, the tests have
more difficulty in precisely identifying the timing of the change.
Accordingly, the changes in persistence may have occurred considerably
before or after the dates identified by the tests. Using a different
methodology, Cogley and Sargent found that inflation persistence
peaked in 1979–80 and has since declined. Stock, however, used yet
another approach that indicated that the persistence of inflation was
essentially unchanged over time.5
Table 1
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE CHANGE IN QUARTERLY
INFLATION
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II. INPUT COSTS
The decline in the volatility and persistence of inflation over the last
20 years could be a result of changes in the pricing behavior of firms. To
build on economists’ theories of price setting, Blinder, Canetti, Lebow,
and Rudd surveyed 200 firms, selected to be a representative sample of
the U.S. economy, on the relevant factors involved in their price-setting
decisions.6 To  learn how frequently these decisions are made, the
authors asked firms, “How often do the prices of your most important
products change in a typical year?” Nearly half of all firms responded
that prices are adjusted at most once a year. When asked why price
adjustment does not occur more frequently, one of the top responses
was, “Our costs do not change more often.” This response highlights
the importance of input costs in the pricing decision. 
Given the markup of price over the cost of production, changes in
input costs may lead to changes in output prices in two basic ways. In the
simplest case, a firm may respond to a cost increase by passing the
increase along directly to the output price. Perhaps more realistically, a
firm may mitigate the input cost increase by substituting to an alternative
input and then passing the smaller cost increase on to its output price.
The basic inputs to production are labor, capital, and materials. This
section describes several recent structural changes in the economy affect-
ing the behavior of the costs of these inputs.
Table 2
PERSISTENCE OF INFLATION: 
ESTIMATES OF BREAKS IN PERSISTENCE LEVEL
Date of Break Persistence Persistence
in Persistence  (before break) (after break)
Core CPI 1990:Q3 .90 .77
(.08) (.09)
Core PCE 1992:Q1 .89 .66
(.03) (.07)
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses.
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and author’s calculations.10 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Labor
Among all inputs to production, labor constitutes the largest
portion of total costs for most goods and services produced. For the
economy as a whole, labor costs, measured as total compensation,
account for approximately 60 percent of total value-added costs in the
economy.7 Labor’s share of total costs has remained relatively stable over
the past 40 years (Chart 2).
Over this same period, the composition of labor costs has changed
dramatically. Broadly defined, labor costs fall into two categories: wages
and salaries paid to workers and benefits. From 1970 through 1993,
wages and salaries paid to workers, expressed as a percentage of GDP,
decreased (Chart 3). Over the same period, benefits paid to workers
increased from 6 percent of GDP to 11 percent of GDP (Chart 3). In
the mid-1990s, these trends reversed, as the fraction of labor costs asso-
ciated with wages began to rise and the fraction associated with benefits
began to fall sharply. Two related features of the labor market that con-
tributed to the trend reversal were the design of benefits packages and
compensation differences between permanent and temporary workers.
Chart 2
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While wages and salaries are set according to the value of the job
performed, many benefits, such as health and dental insurance, are
identical for all employees at a firm. From 1960 to the mid-1990s, the
cost of insurance increased rapidly. Between 1982 and 1993, the
average annual real increase in employer costs per hour worked for
health insurance was 7.3 percent, while real wages and salaries rose only
2.4 percent annually.8 This rapid increase in insurance costs led to large
increases in benefit costs of all employees. 
In an effort to limit labor cost increases, many firms began employ-
ing more temporary workers, which for several reasons was a less
expensive alternative to permanent workers during this period. First,
these workers typically did not receive benefits; all of their compensation
came in the form of wages. Thus, firms were able to limit the number of
employees receiving increasingly costly insurance benefits. Second, labor
costs for temporary and short-term workers were more flexible than costs
for permanent positions. A survey of over 300 business people in New
England showed that wages for newly hired short-term workers were
more flexible during a recession than for newly hired permanent workers
(Bewley).9 For permanent positions, employers said that they preferred
Chart 3
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to pay similar wages to workers in similar positions to avoid morale
problems associated with having large wage differentials. On the other
hand, firms were willing to hire new employees for short-term positions
at lower wages than those of current full-time employees. According to
surveyed firms, a worker in a temporary position was less likely than a
permanent employee to be discouraged by discovering that his wages
were lower than a coworker’s wages.
Empirical studies on changes in the labor force report that the
number of temporary workers in the United States has dramatically
increased in the last two decades. The majority of this growth has been
due to changes in the hiring behavior of firms, as opposed to growth of
a few industries that traditionally employ a large share of temporary
workers. Employment of temporary workers has grown at an annual
rate of over 11 percent since 1972, while total nonfarm employment
has grown by 2 percent per year over the same period (Estevao and
Lach). As a result, temporary jobs account for a much larger fraction of
total employment than in previous decades (Chart 4). 
Chart 4
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The advent of the temporary workforce has given employers more
flexibility in their labor input, which should translate into dampened
movements in the marginal cost of labor over the business cycle. Prior
to the 1980s, strong employment increases during economic booms led
to increases in total compensation, as both wages and benefits costs
rose. Now, employers hire temporary workers to meet short-term
increases in labor demand. They avoid paying for benefits and are not
compelled to provide equal pay across positions. These changes may
translate into smaller fluctuations in labor costs.
Capital
While a growing temporary help sector has increased flexibility of
labor inputs, improved borrowing options for many firms have
enhanced their access to funds for capital investment. In particular,
developments in financial markets may have decreased the volatility of
costs of capital acquisition at certain points in the business cycle. Firms
benefit from lower financing costs through reduced costs of borrowing
for all operational expenses. But the benefit is arguably largest for
capital investment because changes in this input usually require long-
term planning and the most financing. 
Traditionally, many firms have relied on bank loans as their
primary source of borrowed funds. While firms use this source of
lending heavily, the supply of bank loans tends to fluctuate strongly
with the business cycle. In particular, banks typically contract their
loan supply to decrease their exposure to bad loans during down-
turns in the economy. This action reduces firms’ opportunity to
finance investment at the same time their revenue is falling due to
lower demand for their products. As a result, financing costs on loans
rise, or the opportunity to borrow is altogether eliminated, as banks
may refuse to grant a loan. Many firms with profitable opportunities
may be unable to acquire the financing necessary to undertake
capital investment.
Since the 1970s, however, borrowing opportunities outside of the
bank loan sector have expanded significantly. One sector in particular
is the market for commercial paper, which expanded from financing 4
percent of the total debt of nonfinancial companies in 1980 to 714 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
percent of debt in 2000 (Figure 1).10 Although the commercial paper
market is usually accessible only to large firms with strong financial
records, this market has provided a valuable source of funds to this
group of firms, especially during downturns in the economy. During
periods of contractionary monetary policy, the firms with access to the
commercial paper market make less use of bank loans and greater use
of commercial paper. As the commercial paper market expands, the
increases in financing costs and loan refusals associated with a decrease
in bank lending should lessen (Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox). 
The long-term complement to commercial paper, corporate bond
lending, has also expanded in recent decades. From 1980 to 2000, cor-
porate bonds increased from 48 percent to 58 percent of total debt of
nonfinancial companies. Due to the increase in commercial paper and
corporate bond lending, the fraction of total debt financed by bank
lending over the same period decreased from 48 percent to 35 percent.
As a result, firms are less exposed to the fluctuations associated with
changes in bank lending standards over the business cycle, and they can
pursue capital improvement plans with less risk of sharp increases in
borrowing costs associated with downturns in the business cycle.
Figure 1
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Materials
The behavior of input costs over the business cycle may have also
changed as a result of improvements in management of materials. Over
the past 20 years, changes in computer technology have allowed firms
to improve their management of orders and stockpiles of materials, and
thereby cut their inventory-to-sales ratio. This innovation is very impor-
tant for firms because their use of materials is tied closely to production
levels, which vary strongly over the business cycle (Basu). Since 1980,
the level of manufacturing inventories of materials and supplies relative
to shipments of manufactured goods has declined steadily (Chart 5).11
These changes in inventory management have lowered two types of
costs associated with materials: storage costs and financing costs.
The primary reason that firms keep an inventory of materials is to
maintain an adequate supply for the production process. Firms want to
avoid running out of a particular item, which may force the firm to stop
Chart 5
RATIO OF INVENTORIES TO SHIPMENTS
Note: Inventories are those of materials and supplies of total manufacturing. Shipments are those of
total manufacturing.
Source: Census Bureau 
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production. Shutdowns can be very costly for firms since they have to
pay compensation for the idle workers and the machines are unable to
generate revenue through production to pay for their acquisition costs.
However, maintaining an inventory of materials is not costless.12
First, to keep a large quantity of materials on hand, firms need to have
sufficient storage space. The costs of storage can be large depending on
the physical size of the materials and the climate control required, espe-
cially for perishable goods. Second, the firm must finance the cost of the
materials. Depending on the length of the production process and the
stockpile of inventories, the time from the purchase of the materials by
the firm to the time of the payment by the customer for the sale of the
final good could be several months or longer. Until the payment for the
final good is received, firms have to cover the costs of the materials. 
In the past two decades, advances in information technology have
allowed firms to dramatically improve the ways in which they monitor
inventories, purchase materials, and track deliveries, thereby lowering
inventory costs.13Through the use of computer databases, firms are now
able to closely and inexpensively monitor their inventory levels. With
nearly all firms better able to manage their inventories without causing
disruptions in the production process from shortages of materials, they
are less likely to experience large changes in stockpiles that occur during
swings in the business cycle. As a result, when the economy slows, firms
can more quickly reduce their orders of materials. And when orders
drop, the producers of materials likewise can slow production more
quickly than in previous business cycles. Similarly, in the case of an eco-
nomic boom, firms can react more quickly to upturns in economic
demand. The cumulative effect of all of these innovations in inventory
management is that overall production responds more quickly to chang-
ing economic conditions, reducing the need for prices to fluctuate as
surpluses and shortages of goods over the business cycle are limited.
III. MARKUPS
Responding to the survey question asked by Blinder and others
regarding factors affecting price adjustment, firms indicated that a
second element of the pricing decision was the presence of “competi-
tive pressures.” According to basic economic theory, the level ofcompetition in an industry influences the extent to which price is set
above the marginal cost of production, commonly referred to as the
markup. As competition increases, firms have less market and pricing
power, leading to a reduction in the markups that are factored into
prices. Changes in the magnitude of markups over time, as a result of
changes in the structure of the economy, could lead to changes in
observed pricing behavior.
Several studies suggest that the magnitude of markups has
declined over time due to increases in global competition. Beccarello
found that heightened global competition in the period from 1971 to
1989 was associated with a decrease in the markup for firms. His
study was based on manufacturing data for the seven major OECD
countries. Similarly, Marchetti found a negative relationship between
the level of competition and markups using data on Italian manufac-
turing plants from 1977 to 1995. For these plants, increases in
competition, domestic and foreign, were associated with decreases in
the size of the markup. In such a situation, firms may be forced to
respond more quickly to changes in economic conditions because
smaller profit margins provide less cushion against changes in cost. As
a result of a quicker response on the part of firms, increases in compe-
tition may translate into less movement of markups over the business
cycle than observed in the past.14
Markups should also be declining in the United States due to
increases in global competition. While the studies mentioned above do
not focus specifically on the United States, three economic indicators
from U.S. trade data reveal significant increases in global competition.
First, the percentage of imports in total consumption of durables
goods (excluding automobiles) soared from 9 percent in 1970 to 30
percent in 2001 (Chart 6). Second, the percentage of imports in total
consumption of nondurable goods rose from 1 percent in 1970 to over
6.5 percent in 2001 (Chart 6). Third, the percentage of imports in
capital goods expenditures (excluding automobiles) rose from 2.5
percent in 1987 to nearly 17 percent in 2001 (Chart 6). These large
increases, however, are only partially indicative of growing global com-
petition. Some of the increase is also due to the specialization of
production that has occurred as trade barriers have been lowered. For
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example, declines in the textiles and consumer electronics industries
and growth in the high-tech sector in the United States over the past
few decades reflect the effects of specialization. 
IV. FREQUENCY OF ADJUSTMENT
Two additional responses to the survey by Blinder and others relate
specifically to the implementation of a price change. When asked why
firms do not change prices more frequently, many firms cited “costs of
changing prices” and “it would antagonize or cause difficulties for our
customers” as primary factors in their pricing decisions. These responses
indicate that firms, when making their pricing decisions, consider direct
and indirect costs of a price change in addition to factors that affect
their desired price, such as the marginal cost of production and markup.
Costs of price adjustment limit how frequently firms adjust prices. If
these costs were to decrease over time, price adjustment might occur
more often, as firms would find it less costly to react to changing eco-
nomic conditions. 
Chart 6
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To identify the importance of price-adjustment costs, the survey by
Blinder and others included several additional questions. The first ques-
tion on adjustment costs was the following:
Another idea is that the act of changing prices entails special costs in itself, so
firms hesitate to change prices too frequently or by too much. The costs we have
in mind are not production costs, but costs like printing new catalogs, price lists,
etc. or hidden costs like loss of future sales by antagonizing customers, decision
making time of executives, problems with salespeople, and so on. Does your firm
incur such costs when it changes prices?
In answering this question, 43 percent of firms reported they faced such
costs, and an additional 21 percent said they faced adjustment costs,
but that the costs were trivial in size. Nearly half of all firms in the man-
ufacturing, services, transportation, communications, and utilities
sectors reported the presence of significant adjustment costs, while costs
for trade, construction, and mining sector firms were trivial or nonex-
istent for the most part.
The survey asked a follow-up question to identify the source of the
adjustment costs. All firms that indicated the presence of at least a small
adjustment cost were asked, “What is the nature of adjustment costs for
changing prices in your company?” The top four response categories,
ranked by the number of responses received, were the following: (a)
“Printing new catalogs, new price lists, new packaging, etc.”; (b) “Loss
of future sales by antagonizing customers”; (c)”Informing salespeople
and customers”; and (d) “Decision-making time of executives.”
Responses (a), (c), and (d) are often categorized under the general
heading of “menu costs,” a phrase that economists coined to describe
price adjustment in the restaurant industry. In order for a restaurant to
update its prices, it must pay the cost to reprint all of its menus. In
current usage, the definition of menu costs includes all costs associated
with a price change, not just the physical costs of implementing a price
change. Such additional costs include the managerial time involved in
making a pricing decision (response d) and the information costs asso-
ciated with making and implementing a pricing decision (response c).15
Response (b) does not fall in this category of direct costs. Instead, it
points toward an indirect cost associated with a complex demand rela-20 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
tionship between the producer and consumer in which demand for a
product is determined not only by the posted price, but also by the
change in the price from the previous period. 
Empirical studies of menu costs also show that costs of price adjust-
ment are significant for many firms. Labor costs associated with
physically implementing price changes at five multistore supermarket
chains are 0.7 percent of revenues, or 35.2 percent of net profits (Levy,
Bergen, Dutta, and Venable). Total adjustment costs of an industrial
manufacturer comprise 1.23 percent of revenues, or 20.3 percent of net
profits (Zbaracki, Ritson, Levy, Dutta, and Bergen). These costs are
split into the following categories: physical adjustment costs (3.3
percent), managerial costs (22.7 percent), and customer costs (74
percent). The customer costs consist of the time spent conveying price
changes to customers, time spent negotiating prices with customers,
and costs associated with loss of sales due to antagonizing customers.
Costs of price adjustment may have diminished in the past two
decades due to technological changes. First, with the introduction of
scanner technology and sales via the Internet, the costs of implementing
new prices are lower. Previously, all items in retail stores were individu-
ally labeled. A price change required labeling all new items with the
updated price as well as relabeling prices on all existing items on store
shelves. Now scanner technology allows firms to post a single price on
shelves instead of labeling individual items. The advent of the Internet
also provides a retail sector where posted prices can be easily adjusted by
simply modifying a computer document. For example, some large com-
puter manufacturers modify their Internet-posted prices on a weekly, or
even daily, basis. 
Second, the information and managerial costs associated with
pricing decisions are arguably lower due to the improvements in infor-
mation technology. Many firms have improved access to the data on
input costs needed to make a pricing decision. Computers provide
more accurate record keeping, and scanner data provide improved mar-
keting information on consumers, which in both cases allows some
firms to better estimate the demand for their products.16 Therefore,
with improved information resources, it may be less costly and more
profitable for firms to make pricing decisions more frequently. ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2003 21
Third, the cost of antagonizing customers, which was mentioned
several times in the survey by Blinder and others, may now be smaller
because consumers can more easily compare prices of different produc-
ers. If it is easier for consumers to track down prices for substitute
goods, such as through searches on the Internet, consumers may make
informed decisions on the purchase of a product whose price has
increased, rather than simply “punish” a firm for what may be a well-
warranted change in price.
Empirical evidence suggests that prices for some goods are changing
more frequently than in previous years. Two of the most cited studies of
infrequent price adjustment focus on data from newsstand prices of
magazines and retail catalogs. From 1960 to 1979, newsstand prices for
a set of 38 magazines changed on average every 4.9 months (Cecchetti).
Prices for the same set of magazines changed more frequently from
1980 to 2000, on average every 3.3 months (Willis).17 The data on
retail catalogs cover the period from 1953 to 1987. On average, prices
of 12 mail-order goods changed every 14.7 months (Kashyap). Evi-
dence from recent years in this sector suggests that the frequency of
price adjustment might have increased. For example, clothing prices in
the consumer price index survey from 1995 to 1997 were adjusted on
average every 3.3 months (Bils and Klenow). Differences in the
samples, however, may bias this comparison since catalog prices tend to
exhibit less frequent price adjustment than in-store prices.18
V. INFLATION DYNAMICS
While it is evident that the pricing behavior of individual firms has
changed, it is not clear how these changes in firm behavior will affect
the aggregate price level and inflation. Changes in the timing and mag-
nitude of price adjustments by firms could modify the persistence and
volatility of inflation in numerous ways.
The changes in marginal costs discussed above are likely to decrease
the volatility of inflation over the business cycle. As seen in the 1990s,
increased flexibility of labor inputs have damped movements in the
marginal cost of labor over the business cycle and, assuming no change
in markups, will likely limit inflation increases during economic expan-
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downturn, the marginal cost of labor will not fall as quickly as in previ-
ous downturns because firms will lay off temporary workers while
retaining the more highly paid permanent employees. As a result, infla-
tion will not fall as much as in prior recessions. Expanded borrowing
opportunities for firms may also dampen the volatility of inflation. Pre-
viously, the higher borrowing costs faced by many firms added pressure
to increase prices, but with more borrowing options, these cyclical costs
will decrease. Finally, advances in information technology will allow
firms to improve management of materials inventories and production.
Overall production will respond more quickly to changing economic
conditions, reducing the excesses and shortages of goods over different
points in the business cycle. As a result, fluctuations in prices typically
associated with shortages of goods in economic booms and surpluses of
goods in downturns may diminish.
Changes in the costs of price adjustment and markups may lead to
a reduction in the persistence of inflation. If firms are able to adjust
prices more quickly in response to changing economic conditions, due
to lower costs of price adjustment, then aggregate inflation should more
fully reflect the current changes in the economy and relate less to eco-
nomic shocks in prior periods. This increased frequency of price
adjustment will lead to a decrease in persistence—as inflation should
more quickly return to its baseline following an economic shock. As
increased global competition reduces firms’ profit margins, smaller
markups will force them to adjust prices more quickly to changing eco-
nomic conditions in order to remain profitable. In terms of movements
over the business cycle, the range over which the markup can fluctuate
will be reduced. The change in the behavior of markups may reduce the
persistence of inflation.19
VI. CONCLUSION
The implications of recent structural changes for firm pricing
behavior provide several insights into changes that may be occurring in
inflation dynamics. As a result of structural changes in the past 20 years,
many firms have access to a more flexible supply of labor and a more
stable source of financing for investment. Advances in information
technology have improved the management of materials inventories.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2003 23
Combined with decreases in the costs of making price adjustments and
increased competition, these changes have likely contributed to the
observed decreases in persistence and volatility of inflation.
These structural changes may also have important implications for
monetary policy. Historically, monetary policy actions have resulted in
short-term changes in real output during an interval, roughly estimated
between six and nine months, in which prices are slow to adjust. If
firms now adjust their prices more quickly in response to actions by the
monetary authority, then the ability of monetary policy to affect the real
economy with a given change in interest rates has diminished. Impart-
ing the same degree of stimulus will require a larger change in interest
rates than was needed before the structural changes occurred. In this
sense, the structural changes in the real economy may reduce monetary
policy’s influence on the business cycle. But the change in monetary
policy’s influence would not necessarily mean that the economy would
experience larger swings in the business cycle. On the contrary, because
firms now react more quickly to changing economic conditions, they
can adjust prices and inventories to more quickly stabilize the economy
than in the past. 24 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
ENDNOTES
1 Sims and Zha found no evidence of a permanent shift in policy behavior
since 1950. Fair could not reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of an interest
rate rule for monetary policy are identical for the periods 1951:Q1-1979:Q3 and
1979:Q4-1999:Q2. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler tested for changes in monetary
policy behavior between the third quarter of 1979 and the end of 1996. They
found few robust differences across various subsamples within this period. In sup-
port of a change in monetary policy, Romer and Romer documented evidence of
a significant change in the conduct of monetary policy in the 1960s and 1970s.
2 While Cogley and Sargent attributed most of the declining variability to
declining persistence, Stock and Watson found little role for changing persistence,
attributing most of the reduction in variance to less volatile shocks.
3 The breaks in persistence, identified with Andrews’ sup Wald test, have a
significance level of 1 percent.
4 The measure of persistence is calculated as the sum of the autoregressive
coefficients on lagged values of inflation. The SIC criteria was used to determine
the optimal number of lags of inflation to include the regression: three lags for
core CPI and one lag for core PCE. The AIC criteria yields similar results. Confi-
dence intervals were calculated using the Hansen bootstrap methodology, which
estimates precise bound values in a variety of models, including cases when the
largest root is close to 1. For PCE inflation, 90 percent confidence intervals are
[0.88 1.01] from 1960:Q1 through 1992:Q1 and [0.12 0.55] from 1992:Q2
through 2002:Q2. The estimate of persistence for the later subsample presented
in Table 2 lies outside the respective Hansen confidence interval, due in part to
differences in the specification of the constant in each procedure. Estimates in
Table 2 were computed under the restriction of no change in the constant across
the subsamples, while the Hansen bootstrap methodology allowed for separate
estimates of the constant.
5 Contrary to the discussion of structural changes presented in this article,
Cogley and Sargent argued that much of the change in inflation dynamics is due
to the conduct of monetary policy.
6 The survey was conducted between April 1990 and March 1992.
7 In terms of gross output, labor is the second largest input behind materials
costs. Labor accounts for approximately 35 percent of total gross input costs and
materials account for 45 percent (Jorgensen, Gollop, and Fraumeni).
8 From 1994 to 2001, this measure of real health insurance costs increased by
1.5 percent on average. Calculations are based on data from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
9 The survey was conducted between 1992 and 1994.
10 A smaller sector that has also expanded sharply in the past 20 years, pro-
viding additional borrowing opportunities for some firms, is the market for junk
bonds.
11 The inventory-shipments ratio is computed using data from the Census
Bureau. These data are a subset of the data used to compute the more commonly
referenced inventory-sales ratio, which includes data on works in process invento-
ries and final goods inventories. The pattern displayed by the two ratios are qual-
itatively very similar.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2003 25
12 See Aguirregabiria for a study of inventory costs in the supermarket industry.
13 Kahn and McConnell examined inventory behavior during the 2001
recession and concluded that firms were more successful in limiting excess inven-
tories than in previous recessions.
14 The impact on price behavior is less clear because of the empirical uncer-
tainty regarding whether markups move countercyclically or procyclically over the
business cycle. Bils and Kahn, and Rotemberg and Woodford found evidence of
countercyclical markups. Chirinko and Fazzari found evidence of procyclical
markups.
15 See Wolman for a review of the literature on infrequent price adjustment.
16 A recent article from the Wall Street Journal (September 18, 2002) pro-
vided several examples of new pricing methods introduced by industrial firms
that are a result of improved information technology. These methods range from
the creation of a “pricing team” of individuals to track regional trends in prices of
competitors to the use of international surveys of customers to determine how
much firms are willing to pay for an item.
17 Data collected by Willis were used to compute the frequency of newsstand
magazine price adjustment from 1980 to 2000. Average annual inflation was
basically unchanged over the two periods. Inflation was 4.24 percent on average
from 1960 to 1979 and 4.15 percent from 1980 to 2000.
18 Including all items in the BLS survey, prices changed on average every 4.8
months from 1995 to 1997 and 84 percent of consumption fell into categories
where prices change more frequently than once a year.
19 Persistence will fall if markups move procyclically. But if markups move
countercyclically, however, then inflation may in fact become more persistent. 26 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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